THE RATES PERSPECTIVE:
Higher for longer — So what?
Since the inflation shock first started rattling interest-rate markets around the start of 2022, we have focused on trying to understand the drivers of inflation and the policy reactions to this price phenomenon. Our expectation going into 2024 was that disinflation would dominate market narratives, paving the way for rate cuts across the globe. While we were proven right in that regard, with policy easing in most parts of the world, we believe caution is now warranted in the face of changing policies and the potential for volatile markets.
We believe this caution sets the tone for 2025, where the income earned from government bonds can help offset potential rate volatility for investors. The starting point of nominally high global growth should cushion against the impact of a potential global economic slowdown. At this stage, we do not anticipate a recession and the associated rise in downgrades and defaults. We also believe that current high yields adequately compensate investors for the heightened volatility. The notable exception to this view is the back end of the curve, where long-dated bonds face headwinds due to supply dynamics, inflation expectations, and higher nominal growth.
As geopolitical tensions heighten a sense of uncertainty in markets, policymakers’ reaction function will be tested — and our belief is that governments will continue, and indeed be forced, to respond to exogenous shocks by loosening the purse strings. In the wake of the US election, with Germany heading to the polls in early 2025 and China looking to revive its struggling economy, we cannot clearly see where policies (and tariffs) are headed. However, thematically, we should expect higher barriers to trade, via tariffs, and increased fiscal spending, particularly in relation to European defense. While we expect rates to be range-bound, there is a risk to the upside, as global markets become increasingly tense and react to local dynamics.
Testing central banks’ reaction function
The return of the growth/inflation trade-off globally has not only been an important stress test for market participants, who have had to navigate significant exogenous shocks over the last year, but it has also offered us some evidence about policymakers’ reaction function. What we have learned is that governments are eager to protect consumers from upticks in unemployment, while central banks are keen to bring policy rates back down from their current “tight” levels, even if the combination of these actions means stickier inflation.
The new fiscal normal: Spend, spend, spend
Trump’s reelection will likely accelerate underlying trends around weaker labor supply and a deteriorating fiscal backdrop. While the US Federal Reserve (Fed) may slow its cutting cycle sooner than expected, we anticipate volatility in how markets price the pace of future cuts, meaning high yields in government bonds are likely here to stay, and may move even higher for long-dated bonds. Globally, we expect governments to continue tapping into bond markets for an ever-increasing laundry list of fiscal commitments, ranging from higher defense spending to capital investments and improving climate resilience. The first 20 years of this century were dominated by secular trends that proved to be disinflationary and are now being (partially) reversed through deglobalization and aging demographics.
- Focusing on the US, we expect the second Trump administration to be in place relatively soon after the inauguration in January, which should give us greater clarity on how much of his proposed policy mix of tariffs, taxes, and curbing immigration will be delivered. In the meantime, we are watching the appointments list in key areas such as the National Economic Council (NEC), the Treasury Department, the Commerce Department, and the US Trade Representative. While the Fed will likely continue cutting rates, as the US has perhaps made the most headway in tackling inflation, there is a real risk that reflationary policies will slow progress, necessitating rates staying higher for longer.
- In the euro area, after a brief period of remarkable unity and urgency around the twin challenges of the COVID pandemic and the energy shock, we expect the policy response to immediate exogenous shocks (such as tariffs) to return to a familiar pattern of lengthy decision making and compromises. With the reintroduction of the European Commission’s fiscal rules, we expect there to be limited scope for euro-area and other European Union (EU) countries to meaningfully counter incoming tariffs with significant government spending or a cohesive response across the currency bloc. This comes at a time of perceived fragility for some of the larger countries in the EU. Contrary to the US, we see downward pressure on European yields, where the European Central Bank may need to intervene and cut rates at a faster pace than markets are pricing in.
- In the UK, persistent inflation and an expansionary budget deficit have already caused markets to reduce rate-cut expectations. Should the cycle continue to demonstrate resilience through a strong labor market, sticky core inflation, and renewed housing activity, there is a real risk gilts could de-anchor and move higher than their European peers.
- In Japan, we expect front-end yields to climb steadily toward the Bank of Japan’s target of 1% by the summer, as deflation risks have now firmly given way to a reflation story driven by positive wage growth, imported inflation, and changes in consumer behavior.
- In China, a market that has continued to diverge from the rest of the world, policymakers have not yet decisively addressed a significant balance-sheet recession, so we expect rates to remain low. The focus, thus far, has been on deleveraging local-government balance sheets, making housing less of a speculative asset, and focusing on growth driven by exports. China could be a potentially global deflationary force.
Divergence: Implications for investors
Amid increased volatility, the theme of divergence could become entrenched in policymaking too. While this has not been the case for decades, there is a precedent (the 1970s) for extended periods of time when central banks did not set rates in sync with one another. As the growth/inflation trade-off acquires increasingly local dimensions, rates markets may become increasingly sensitive to national cycles rather than the global cycle. We don’t think investors have yet priced this in.
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By
Andrew Heiskell
Nicolas Wylenzek